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ABSTRACT 
As many as 400,000 people die each year, and a million are injured, by preventable 
medical injuries sustained in the U.S. health system. Collection of data to enhance 
understanding of how unintended medical injuries happen is an essential part of 
harm-reduction strategies. While health system data collection and reporting 
processes have improved in recent years, the scope and intractability of the medical 
injuries problem demands new efforts. The legal system could contribute valuable 
medical injury data to patient safety efforts but current practices largely prevent it. In 
medical malpractice claims where parties settle, case information is routinely 
protected from disclosure by confidentiality agreements thus any medical injury 
information is inaccessible. Parties who litigate may convince a court to seal their 
case files, thereby keeping data out of investigator’s reach. Insurers have extensive 
claim files, rich with information, but provide access only at their discretion. Most 
notably, fewer than 3% of patients who are injured in the health system ever bring a 
claim. Therefore, a vast pool of medical injury information lies dormant, never 
developed through legal claims. This Note argues that the tort system’s social utility 
purpose would be better served if more information about medical harm were 
exposed. Though numerous barriers would need to be overcome, data of value to the 
health system, and the patients who depend on it, could be extracted from (1) out-of-
court settlements, (2) sealed court records, (3) medical malpractice insurance claims, 
and (4) by stimulating medical malpractice claims to create a larger data pool. 
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I. Introduction 
It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data.1 
–Sir Arthur Conan Doyle 
 
na Jimenez-Salgado had a bilateral mastectomy to treat breast 
cancer but, after the surgery, she discovered she had never had 
cancer.2 She filed a successful lawsuit.3 
The newborn twins of actor Dennis Quaid and his wife received, in 
error, one thousand times the ordered dose of the blood thinner 
heparin.4 The babies survived and their parents settled a lawsuit with 
the hospital.5 
While Rebecca Fielding waited two hours for an emergency 
Caesarean section to deliver her son, Enzo, his brain was deprived of 
oxygen resulting in cerebral palsy and a seizure disorder.6 The family 
received one of the largest medical malpractice judgments in Maryland 
history.7 
These cases demonstrate the intersection of two complex entities, 
the U.S. health and legal systems. It is this nexus, where a medical 
injury8 becomes a medical malpractice claim, that is the focus of this 
Note. 
                                                
1 ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, THE MEMOIRS OF SHERLOCK HOLMES 7 (1892). 
2 Letter from John F. Krattli, Senior Assistant Cnty. Counsel, Cnty. of L. A., to 
Sachi A. Hamai, Exec. Officer, L.A. Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, Re: Ana Jiminez-
Salgado v. Cnty. of Los Angeles (July 26, 2010), http://file.lacounty.gov 
/bos/supdocs/56035.pdf [http://perma.cc/2PSR-8CE5]. 
3 Id. 
4 Scott Hensley, Dennis Quaid Acts on Medical Errors, WSJ BLOGS (Mar. 28, 
2008, 10:04 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2008/03/28/dennis-quaid-acts-on-
medical-errors [http://perma.cc/N45T-YKUC]. 
5 Dennis Quaid Settles with Hospital on Twins Overdose, REUTERS (Dec. 16, 
2008, 3:55 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/12/16/us-quaid-
idUSTRE4BF6S920081216 [http://perma.cc/B5G5-BXCK]. 
6 Yvonne Wenger & Kevin Rector, Jury Awards Waverly Family $55 Million in 





8 A word about words: The language used to describe medical errors has grown 
cumbersome. Healthcare providers sometimes make mistakes (errors). Those 
 
A 
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The bombshell. The health system, like many patients entrusted to 
its care, is afflicted. Medical errors were the focus of the Institute of 
Medicine’s 1999 “To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System.”9 
The book “dropped a bombshell” by reporting that up to 98,000 people 
die each year in U.S. hospitals due to medical mistakes.10 With the 
medical error problem quantified and squarely in the public eye, the 
health system launched system-wide patient safety improvement 
efforts. At the foundation of these efforts to reduce harm is 
comprehensive collection and analysis of data.11 Valid data is required 
to help researchers, healthcare providers, and other stakeholders grasp 
how errors occur so remedies can be designed to reduce them, as well 
as to measure how effective solutions are.12 
Learning from malpractice litigation. But despite extensive 
efforts within the health system to reduce medical errors and injuries, 
                                                                                                               
errors may result in a physical harm (an injury) but not all errors cause injuries. 
The patient safety literature now calls errors that result in harm “preventable 
adverse events” but this Note will use “medical injury.” Patients do experience 
harm from medical care even in the absence of errors. For example, patients 
experience pain following surgery–an expected outcome. Patients may also 
experience a side effect from treatment. For example, an intended outcome of 
cold medications is relief of nasal congestion. A side effect of the medication 
may be drowsiness. The side effect was not caused by an error and is not an 
injury. This Note uses “medical negligence” and “medical malpractice” 
interchangeably to refer to substandard care that results in an injury even though 
not all instances of negligent care result in an injury. This Note refers to 
“claims” instead of “lawsuits” because not all claims become lawsuits. 
9 Institute of Medicine, TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 
26 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter TO ERR IS HUMAN] (estimating 
between 44,000 and 98,000 Americans die each year from preventable medical 
errors). 
10 Marshall Allen, How Many Die From Medical Mistakes in U.S. Hospitals?, 
PROPUBLICA (Sep. 19, 2013, 10:03 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article 
/how-many-die-from-medical-mistakes-in-us-hospitals [http://perma.cc/3KRF-
QDY6]. 
11 TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 9, at 4 (“Much can be learned from the analysis 
of errors. All adverse events resulting in serious injury or death should be 
evaluated to assess whether improvements in the delivery system can be made to 
reduce the likelihood of similar events occurring in the future”). 
12 Joanna C. Schwartz, A Dose of Reality for Medical Malpractice Reform, 88 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1226 (2013) (citing TO ERR IS HUMAN, supra note 9, at 5-15 
(summarizing the Institute of Medicine’s recommendations for reducing medical 
error in U.S. hospitals)). 
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progress has been “sluggish.” 13  Since gathering data is vital to 
progress, the health system could benefit by seeking new sources of 
data from an entity sometimes perceived as the “enemy”—the legal 
system. 
Medical malpractice litigation reveals information.14 It can help a 
hospital (or other healthcare organization) understand where it is prone 
to problems as well as to guide change.15 Medical malpractice claims16 
can reveal medical errors not reported through other means, and the 
information developed through discovery and trial is often more 
complete than what appears in medical records alone. 17  In fact, 
anesthesia malpractice claims studies are credited with stimulating 
change that reduced the danger of receiving anesthesia.18 
But, much malpractice data is not accessible. Most medical 
malpractice information remains beyond the reach of health care 
leaders, researchers, providers, and others because (1) information is 
often sealed in court records or settlements with non-disclosure 
provisions, (2) insurance carriers provide limited access to data in 
malpractice claim records, and (3) only about 3% of medical injury 
cases are ever litigated so no records are generated in most instances.19 
These barriers to producing medical injury data could be overcome. 
                                                
13 Robert Wachter, The ‘Must Do’ List: Certain Patient Safety Rules Should Not be 
Elective, HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG, (Aug. 20, 2015), http://healthaffairs.org 
/blog/2015/08/20/the-must-do-list-certain-patient-safety-rules-should-not-be-
elective [http://perma.cc/FV9T-EXKP]. 
14 Schwartz, supra note 12, at 1246. 
15 Id. at 1266. 
16 This Note uses the term “claim” to describe a demand for compensation made to 
a health care provider’s insurer by a claimant who alleges negligent medical 
treatment resulting in an injury. After a claim is filed, the insurer may settle the 
case, negotiate over the compensation amount or refuse to compensate the 
claimant. If the parties do not arrive at a resolution, and the claimant desires to 
pursue the case, the claimant’s lawyer may file a lawsuit. Not all claims ripen 
into lawsuits; they can be abandoned prior to proceeding to the court system. 
Thomas H. Cohen & Kristen A. Hughes, Medical Malpractice Insurance Claims 
in Seven States, 2000-2004, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. 
SPECIAL REPORT (Mar. 2007), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mmicss 
04.pdf[http://perma.cc/52EA-VJKF]. 
17 Schwartz, supra note 12, at 1297. 
18 George J. Annas, The Patient’s Right to Safety–Improving the Quality of Care 
through Litigation against Hospitals, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2065 (2006). 
19 See infra part III for a description of the inaccessibility of medical malpractice 
insurance data. 
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Less litigation secrecy would increase data availability. When 
malpractice cases are settled, payment to the claimant is generally 
conditioned on a nondisclosure agreement 20  that prohibits injured 
parties from discussing their case.21 Additionally, parties engaged in 
malpractice litigation can request judicial sealing of court records, 
thereby barring access.22 
Placing limits on nondisclosure agreements in settlements, or on a 
court’s ability to seal records, is controversial and impassioned 
advocates exist on both sides of the debate. Those who support 
confidentiality argue it is vital to the viability of the courts23 and that 
lack of confidentiality would impinge on litigants’ ability to resolve 
disputes with minimal intrusion from external forces. 24  In turn, if 
settlement were less attractive, limited court resources would be 
overwhelmed. 25  Further, some secrecy advocates view the civil 
litigation system solely as a forum for private parties to resolve private 
disputes—not as a tool of social justice.26 
Advocates of greater transparency (“sunshine”) argue that 
litigation records should not be sealed if they contain information that 
adversely affects public health and safety. 27  They contend that, in 
cases like the Agent Orange settlement, the exploding Firestone tires 
settlement, and the Johns-Manville asbestos settlement, danger to the 
public would have been revealed sooner, and many lives saved, if 
documents had not been sealed.28 
                                                
20 A non-disclosure agreement is also referred to as a confidentiality clause or 
agreement. 
21 William M. Sage et al., Use of Nondisclosure Agreements in Medical 
Malpractice Settlements by a Large Academic Health Care System, 175 JAMA 
INTERN. MED. 1130, 1131 (2015). 
22 Joseph W. Doherty et al. eds., CONFIDENTIALITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND THE U.S. 
CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM xvii (2012). 
23 David S. Sanson, The Pervasive Problem of Court-Sanctioned Secrecy and the 
Exigency of National Reform, 53 DUKE L.J. 807, 809 (2003). 
24 Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the 
Courts, 105 HARV. L. REv. 427, 432 (1991). 
25 Adam Liptak, Judges Seek to Ban Secret Settlements in South Carolina, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sep. 2, 2002, http://www.nytimes.com/2002/09/02/us/judges-seek-to-
ban-secret-settlements-in-south-carolina.html [http://perma.cc/YL47-ACZ3]. 
26 Miller, supra note 24, at 441. 
27 Jillian Smith, Secret Settlements: What You Don’t Know Can Kill You!, 2004 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 237, 240 (2004). 
28 Sanson, supra note 23, at 813. 
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More access to insurance claims data would uncover problems. 
Liability insurance, including medical liability insurance, is a cog in 
the civil justice system as well as a window through which to observe 
the system.”29 Malpractice insurance claims data can be used to detect 
problematic clinical processes and devise strategies to reduce 
negligence.30 However, the process for obtaining access to insurance 
data is time-consuming and uncertain.31 
More litigation would generate more data. The biggest barrier to 
extracting data from the legal system to inform health system change 
is that most is merely “potential” data. About 97% of patients who 
experience a medical injury do not pursue a legal remedy.32 Therefore, 
there are no records from which to extract information, sealed or 
otherwise, in the great majority of medical injury cases. 
The social utility of malpractice litigation. Legal scholars have 
debated the aims of tort law and most agree on two: (1) compensation 
for injured parties and (2) deterrence of undesired behavior.33 This 
Note adopts the perspective that these aims are subsumed under social 
utility, a broader societal goal. Social utility incorporates justice to the 
individual as a goal, but its primary concern is rules that work toward 
the good of society.34 
In the 1960s, common law torts started to serve a quasi-regulatory 
and public law function in resolving intractable social problems where 
regulation or criminal law failed.35 Medical injuries have proved to be 
just such an intractable social problem. Therefore, the tort system, as 
purveyor of social justice, has a valid and appropriate role to play in 
advancing the goal of reducing the epidemic of patient injuries.36 
                                                
29 Tom Baker, Transparency through Insurance: Mandates Dominate Discretion, 
in CONFIDENTIALITY, TRANSPARENCY, AND THE U.S. CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 185 
(Joseph W. Doherty et al. eds., 2012). 
30 Richard Kravitz et al., Malpractice Claims Data as a Quality Improvement 
Tool: I. Epidemiology of Error in Four Specialties, 266 JAMA 2087, 2087 
(1991). 
31 Baker, supra note 29, at 186. 
32 See infra part II for a description of medical malpractice litigation rates. 
33 DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 12 (2000). 
34 Id. 
35 Michael L. Rustad, Torts as Public Wrongs, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 433, 522 (2011). 
36 The Ford Explorer/exploding Firestone tires case illustrates how tort law serves 
a larger purpose beyond the plaintiff and defendant. The National Highway 
Traffic Administration (NHTSA) acted only after trial lawyers used discovery to 
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The Argument. Due to the extent of harm befalling patients, 
efforts should be made to gather data that enhances understanding of 
why medical injuries occur—including excavating data from medical 
injury claims and lawsuits. This Note argues that (1) secrecy in out-of-
court settlements and judicial records should be minimized when 
public health risks are involved; 2) greater access to medical 
malpractice insurance claims data would illuminate medical injury 
problems, and 3) the pool of untapped medical injury data in dormant 
claims—the 97% that are never brought–could be accessible if more 
claims are brought. These proposals, of course, will meet resistance. 
But each day, 600 to 1200 people die as a result of harm they 
encounter in the health system37 and over 2700 are injured.38 
The remainder of this Note proceeds as follows. Part II—The 
Health System Grapples with the Medical Injury Epidemic—describes 
the complexity of U.S. health services and the extent of medical 
injuries. Part III—How the Legal System Deals with Medical 
Malpractice—describes the tort of medical malpractice and barriers in 
the legal system that prevent access to medical harm data. Part IV—
Medical Malpractice Litigation Has Improved Patient Safety—
describes examples of how medical malpractice litigation has 
improved patient safety. Part V—Recommendations for Extracting 
Malpractice Data from the Legal System—identifies strategies for 
increasing the access to medical injury data in the legal system. Part 
VI—Conclusions—summarizes key elements in the Note. 
  
                                                                                                               
uncover that Firestone tires on Explorers had caused hundreds of rollover 
accidents due to tread separation. See id. at 535-36. 
37 John T. James, A New, Evidence-based Estimate of Patient Harms Associated 
with Hospital Care, 9 J. PATIENT SAF. 122, 122 (2013). 
38 Lucian L. Leape, Preventing Medical Accidents: Is “Systems Analysis” The 
Answer?, 27 AM. J.L. & MED. 145, 146 (2001). 
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II. THE HEALTH SYSTEM GRAPPLES WITH MEDICAL INJURIES 
[I]t does not matter whether the deaths of 100,000, 
200,000, or 400,000 Americans each year are 
associated with preventable adverse events in hospitals. 
Any of the estimates demands assertive action on the 
part of providers, legislators and people who will one 
day become patients.39 
–Dr. John T. James 
A. Scope of U.S. Health System Services 
The U.S. health system provides an enormous volume of services 
annually via 35 million inpatient hospital stays, 51 million medical 
procedures, 126 million clinic visits, and 136 million emergency 
department visits.40 Health services are delivered in more than 5,600 
hospitals,41  5,300 ambulatory surgery centers,42  and 15,400 nursing 
care facilities.43 Because of the sophisticated nature of care provided in 
the American “medical-industrial complex,” 44  and the number of 
                                                
39 James, supra note 37, at 127. 
40 Hospital Utilization (in Non-Federal Short-Stay Hospitals), CENTERS FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (2015), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/ 
fastats/hospital.htm [http://perma.cc/MLL6-KMTT]. These numbers include 
only non-federal healthcare so care provided in U.S. military, veteran’s hospitals 
and Bureau of Prisons entities are not reflected. Id. 
41 Fast Facts on U.S. Hospitals, AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION (2015), 
http://www.aha.org/research/rc/stat-studies/fast-facts.shtml [http://perma. 
cc/D8BY-7WVT]. 
42 Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy, Ambulatory Surgical Center 
Services, ch. 3 115 MEDPAC (March 2015), http://www.medpac.gov/ 
documents/reports/chapter-5-ambulatory-surgical-center-services-(march-2015-
report).pdf?sfvrsn=0 [http://perma.cc/YLP6-7NRE]. 
43 Total Number of Certified Nursing Facilities, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION 
(2015), http://kff.org/other/state-indicator/number-of-nursing-facilities [http:// 
perma. cc/HKQ4-F3A9]. 
44 The term “medical-industrial complex” is a play on President Dwight 
Eisenhower’s use of “military-industrial complex”—language he used as a 
caution to the American people that the military would distort social policy 
because of its bent toward producing more elaborate and expensive military 
equipment. See Edward Goldsmith, The Medical Industrial Complex (June 1, 
1990), http://www.edwardgoldsmith.org/53/the-medical-industrial-complex 
[http://perma.cc/DMF3-GFXV]. Similarly, “medical industrial complex” has 
been used to refer to the increasing expense and technological complexity of the 
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people involved with diverse backgrounds and training, healthcare is 
prone to errors, especially when there is little time to react to 
unexpected events.45 Early medical error studies focused on hospitals, 
but medical misadventures occur in all clinical settings, including 
outpatient clinics, nursing facilities, and patient’s homes.46 
B.  Scope of Medical Injuries: “Erring” the Health System’s 
Dirty Laundry 
When “To Err is Human” reported that up to 98,000 people die in 
U.S. hospitals each year due to avoidable medical error, a media 
frenzy erupted.47 The book received front-page coverage in The New 
York Times, The Washington Post, and other major papers as well as 
television news coverage. 48  Congressional hearings ensued as 
government agencies, healthcare groups, healthcare accrediting 
organizations, and insurers demanded change. 49  But patient safety 
experts now say it’s time to stop citing the Institute of Medicine’s 
figure of 98,000 annual deaths.50 Why? Because it’s too conservative. 
A 2013 study found that, based on more recent data, 210,000 to 
400,000 deaths result from preventable harm each year in hospitals.51 
This pegs medical error as the third leading cause of death in the 
U.S.52 
                                                                                                               
health system. See Arnold S. Relman, The New Medical-Industrial Complex, 
303 NEW ENG. J. MED 963 (1980). 
45 Molla S. Donaldson, An Overview of To Err is Human: Re-emphasizing the 
Message of Patient Safety, in PATIENT SAFETY AND QUALITY: AN EVIDENCE-
BASED HANDBOOK FOR NURSES ch. 3 1 (Ronda G. Hughes ed., 2008), 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK2673 [http://perma.cc/DK5P-9TYL]. 
46 Id. 
47 Susan Dentzer, Media Mistakes in Coverage of the Institute of Medicine’s 
Report, 6 EFFECTIVE CLINICAL PRACTICE (Nov./Dec. 2000), http://ecp. 
acponline .org/novdec00/dentzer.htm [http://perma.cc/C9QW-ANRB]. 
48 Id. 
49 Donaldson, supra note 45. 
50 Allen, supra note 10 (describing the experts who have confidence in James’ data 
including Dr. Lucian Leape, a Harvard physician who is considered the “father 
of patient safety.” Leape served on the Institute of Medicine Committee 
responsible for writing “TO ERR IS HUMAN.”). 
51 James, supra note 37, at 122. 
52 Cheryl Clark, Medical Errors Third Leading Cause of Death, Senators Told, 
HEALTH LEADERS MEDIA (July 14, 2014), http://healthleadersmedia.com/ 
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Fatalities are only part of the problem. More than a million people 
are injured each year by medical treatments.53 The economic impact 
associated with these preventable adverse events was $17 billion for 
one year as measured by healthcare expenses, lost income, lost 
household production, and disability costs.54 
C. Patient Safety Efforts—and Their Limits 
A flourish of efforts to diminish medical injuries was implemented 
after the 1999 publication of “To Err is Human.” The tactics included 
changing culture within healthcare organizations by adopting 
approaches used in “high reliability” organizations that are relatively 
mistake-free, like nuclear power plants and air traffic control.55 
The new approaches joined those used for many years like hospital 
“morbidity and mortality” conferences, an educational forum where 
physicians discuss clinical problems. 56  Internal reporting systems 
(“incident reports”), a staple in hospitals for decades, are used to 
identify errors and near-errors. Incident reports have limited usefulness 
because they are voluntary,57 providers are known not to report all 
errors (they “under-report”),58 and errors rates cannot be derived from 
                                                                                                               
content.cfm?content_id=306564&page=1&topic=QUA [http://perma.cc/F2RQ-
ZT44]. 
53 Leape, supra note 38, at 146. Dr. Leape, a visionary leader in the patient safety 
field, contended that the million injuries figure was an underestimate–in 2001. 
Id. 
54 Jill Van Den Bos et al., The $17.1 Billion Problem: The Annual Cost of 
Measurable Medical Errors, 30 HEALTH AFF. 596 (2011) (describing how 
researchers used actuarial techniques to measure the frequency and costs of 
measurable medical errors identified in nearly nine years of insurance claims 
data. The most common errors were pressure ulcers (bed sores), post-operative 
infections, and post-laminectomy syndrome, and persistent pain following back 
surgery). 
55 ROBERT M. WACHTER, UNDERSTANDING PATIENT SAFETY 255 (2012). 
56 See e.g., ATUL GAWANDE, COMPLICATIONS: A SURGEON’S NOTES ON AN 
IMPERFECT SCIENCE 57-70 (2002) (describing the process used in morbidity and 
mortality conferences to learn from patients’ cases). 
57 See WACHTER, supra note 55, at 234-35 (describing that errors are so common 
that a report made on each error would capsize the system; for example, an 
average intensive care unit patient experiences 1.7 errors per day in their care 
and an average hospitalized patient has one medication error each day.). 
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them.59 Since both morbidity and mortality conferences and incident 
reports are confidential internal activities, what one facility uncovers 
remains protected within that organization. 
Hospitals also use patient chart reviews, computerized 
surveillance, review of multiple source data (e.g., medical records, 
laboratory, pharmacy, and billing), observation of patient care, and 
walking rounds on patients-each has weaknesses in detecting and 
monitoring patient safety issues.60 
Sentinel events, serious errors such as surgery on the wrong limb, 
trigger a search for underlying “root” causes of the errors and produce 
recommendations to prevent similar errors in the future.61 The Joint 
Commission, the quality agency that collects these analyses, 
encourages healthcare organizations to report major errors but 
reporting data is voluntary and thus this data also has limited value.62 
Significant personnel and financial resources have been invested to 
improve patient safety and nearly all healthcare organizations have 
                                                                                                               
58 David M. Studdert et al., Medical Malpractice, 350 N. ENG. J. MED. 283, 287 
(2004) (describing that a feature of physician’s unwillingness to participate in 
certain patient safety activities is manifested by underreporting to adverse-event 
reporting systems). 
59 See WACHTER, supra note 55, at 235. If reports of medication errors were to 
drop from one month to the next in a hospital for example, there is no way to 
know if the actual number of errors dropped or the voluntary reports decreased. 
Id. 
60 Fang Sun, Monitoring Patient Safety Problems, AHRQ, No. 211, MAKING 
HEALTH CARE SAFER II: AN UPDATED CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE EVIDENCE 
FOR PATIENT SAFETY PRACTICES 2-3 (2013), http://www.ahrq.gov/sites/ 
default/files/wysiwyg/research/findings/evidence-based-reports/services/quality 
/ptsafetyII-full.pdf [http://perma.cc/4Y5E-VV4J]. 
61 WACHTER, supra note 55, at 244-45. 
62 Sentinel Event Data, THE JOINT COMMISSION, (2015), http://www.joint 
commission.org/assets/1/18/Root_Causes_Event_Type_2004-2Q_2015.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/9AR4-UDWS] (describing that sentinel event reporting to The 
Joint Commission is voluntary and since it represents a small proportion of 
actual events conclusions should not be drawn from it). The Joint Commission is 
an independent, not-for-profit organization that plays a major role in assessing 
and setting quality standards in the U.S. health system. It accredits and certifies 
nearly 21,000 healthcare organizations and programs in the United States. The 
Joint Commission, http://www.jointcommission.org/about_us/about_the_joint_ 
commission_main.aspx [http://perma.cc/GM3C-RQAG] (last visited Dec. 18, 
2015). 
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made patient safety a primary strategic priority.63 But progress has not 
matched the level of effort and investment, 64  in fact, it has been 
described as “sluggish.” 65  Three studies in the decade after the 
publication of “To Err is Human” found high rates of preventable 
harm continued largely unabated in U.S. hospitals.66 
III. MISSING IN ACTION: MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DATA 
Many liability doctrines shine a light on less than 
salutary health care practices.67 
–Barry Furrow, J.D. 
A. The Tort Liability System 
The civil justice system provides opportunity for redress to 
individuals harmed in a manner considered compensable through tort 
or other civil liability law.68 In American society, tort law is the default 
regulator of safety and economic power.69 Distinguished legal scholar 
Roscoe Pound described tort law as weighing individual interests in 
order to advance social interests.70 Tort law’s “signature” has been 
characterized as its flexibility in enabling consumers to uncover 
emerging dangers or risks affecting them and others in society.71 
Additionally, Americans use their court systems not just as a 
means of resolving disputes, but also to produce information useful to 
                                                
63 AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY [hereinafter AHRQ], No. 
211, MAKING HEALTH CARE SAFER II: AN UPDATED CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE 
EVIDENCE FOR PATIENT SAFETY PRACTICES ii, ES-1 (2013). 
64 Id. 
65 Wachter, supra note 13. 
66 AHRQ, supra note 63. 
67 Barry R. Furrow, The Patient Injury Epidemic: Medical Malpractice Litigation 
as a Curative Tool, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 41, 63 (2011). 
68 Baker, supra note 29, at 185. This Note uses Baker’s definition of the American 
civil justice system: the courts, law firms, government legal agencies, the 
organized bar, organizations that assist claimants and defendants, and liability 
insurance firms. Id. 
69 John T. Nockleby & Shannon Curreri, 100 Years of Conflict: The Past and 
Future of Tort Retrenchment, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1021, 1036 (2005). 
70 Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1, 4 (1943). 
71 Rustad, supra note 35, at 526. 
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society.72 But the civil justice system is increasingly opaque.73 Less 
than five percent of the millions of tort injury claims filed each year 
are resolved through public trial; most are settled in private forums 
like mediation and arbitration with undisclosed terms. 74  As the 
proportion of cases going to trial declines, courts are less able to serve 
as “revealers” of societally useful information. 75  Therefore, it’s 
necessary to look to other strategies to reveal socially valuable medical 
injury information. 
B. The Tort of Medical Malpractice 
Introduction. Medical malpractice is a form of tort liability with 
two prime objectives: (1) to compensate patients who sustain an injury 
due to healthcare provider negligence, and (2) to deter providers from 
negligent practice. 76  A medical malpractice claim arises when a 
plaintiff alleges negligent medical treatment caused an injury.77 In a 
medical negligence claim, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that: 
1) The relationship between the plaintiff/patient and 
defendant/healthcare provider gave rise to a duty; 
2) The defendant’s care fell below the applicable standard; 
3) The plaintiff suffered an injury; and 
4) The injury was caused by the defendant’s negligence.78 
Other liability doctrines can form the basis of claims, including 
informed consent doctrine that recognizes patients’ informational 
                                                
72 Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the Rules Governing 
Public Access to Information Generated Through Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 375, 402 (2006). 
73 Doherty, supra note 22, at ix. 
74 Id. 
75 Goldstein, supra note 72, at 403. 
76 Daniel P. Kessler, Evaluating the Medical Malpractice System and Options for 
Reform, 25 J. ECON. PERSPECT. 93, 93 (2011). 
77 Medical Malpractice Insurance Claims in Seven States, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., 2000-2004 (March, 2007), http://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/mmicss04.pdf [http://perma.cc/2NQT-ENW9]. 
78 MICHELLE M. MELLO & DAVID M. STUDDERT, The Medical Malpractice 
System-Structure and Performance, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. 
HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 11-12 (William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh eds., 2006). 
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needs, provisions in the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active 
Labor Act (EMTALA) that mandate stabilizing treatment before a 
patient can be transferred to another hospital, and duty to warn.79 
A medical malpractice claim may be brought against a nurse, 
pharmacist, psychologist, or other health professional but physicians 
most frequently face claims.80 Hospitals and other health organizations 
may be claimed against and the law in most states permits health 
professionals and health facilities to be held jointly and severally 
liable.81 
Disposal of malpractice claims. A medical malpractice claim can 
be disposed of in a settlement prior to or after a lawsuit filing, or when 
a lawsuit is closed after a verdict or judgment is reached at trial.82 
Most are resolved outside of courtrooms—only 7.8% of medical 
malpractices cases were disposed of by jury or bench trials in 2005.83 
C. What Prevents Access to Medical Malpractice Data? 
There is a well-known parable involving an elephant and three 
blind men.84 Each of the men attempts to describe the entirety of an 
elephant through only the small part of the elephant that each feels. 
One touches a tusk, one the elephant’s side, and so on. Each “knows” 
what an elephant is based on the little they know individually, and 
each is right—to a point. 
Like the men in the parable, what is now known about medical 
harm is only a portion of the problem. More information would 
provide a clearer picture of the complexities of medical injuries, 
thereby contributing to the development of strategies to improve 
patient safety. But three barriers currently prevent this. 
Barrier #1: Most injured parties do not bring claims so legal 
data does not exist in a form that can be used. In contrast to the 
                                                
79 Barry R. Furrow, The Patient Injury Epidemic: Medical Malpractice Litigation 
as a Curative Tool, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 41, 63 (2011). 
80 MELLO, supra note 78, at 12. 
81 Id. at 12. 
82 DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 77. 
83 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., PUB. NO. NCJ 228129, Tort 
Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 2005 14 (Nov. 2009), http://www. 
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extent of medical malpractice that occurs in the U.S. each year, there is 
little litigation in response to it. Tom Baker, an insurance and medical 
malpractice expert, explained that, depending on how statistics are 
analyzed, there is one medical malpractice lawsuit for every seven to 
twenty-five serious medical injuries.85 In contrast, Baker points out, 
nearly everyone injured by a negligent driver files an insurance claim 
or lawsuit.86 Baker’s malpractice math rests on highly regarded studies 
that bear out his claim. In the 1990 Harvard Medical Practice Study, 
researchers reviewed over 30,000 patient records in New York 
hospitals. Of the 280 patients identified who had adverse events 
caused by medical negligence, eight filed malpractice claims thus 
about 97% did not sue.87 When the Harvard researchers replicated the 
study in Utah and Colorado, they got the same result: 97% of patients 
who suffered a negligent injury did not sue.88 A third study in Chicago 
produced consistent findings: less than 4% of injured patients filed 
claims.89 
Barrier #2: Secrecy in settlements and court records bars 
access. Courts can sanction secrecy through protective orders on 
discovery materials, by sealing court records, and through 
confidentiality provisions in settlement agreements. 90  Alternatively, 
parties may settle out of court and a court then has no control over the 
agreement.91 While a court may reserve the right to open a sealed 
record or settlement, sealed records and settlements generally remain 
permanently closed to all nonparties.92 
                                                
85 TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 23 (2007). 
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87 A. Russell Localio et al., Relation Between Malpractice Claims and Adverse 
Events Due to Negligence-Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study III, 
325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 345, 345 (1991). 
88 David M. Studdert et al., Negligent Care and Malpractice Claiming Behavior in 
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Most civil litigation, including medical malpractice, ends in 
settlement.93 When medical malpractice claims are settled, payment to 
a plaintiff is generally conditioned on a signed release that includes a 
nondisclosure agreement (also referred to as a confidentiality 
agreement or a “gag order”).94 Healthcare providers and organizations 
have compelling reasons to seek confidential resolution to medical 
malpractice claims. Several means are available to shield information 
from disclosure.95 Many defendants wish to avoid the embarrassment 
of a public trial, are concerned about reputational harm, or prefer the 
expediency of a settlement.96 They may believe that public news of a 
settlement will trigger other claims against them.97 
Confidential, or “secret” settlements related to sexual abuse by 
priests, asbestos, tobacco, and silicone breast implants have garnered 
significant public attention.98 The term “secret settlement” refers to: 
a range of practices that result in a settlement between 
disputing parties on terms not subject to public 
scrutiny. The secrecy of many settlements is achieved 
simply by a private contract between the parties that is 
not filed with the court. Some settlement agreements 
however, are filed under seal with the court, ensuring 
judicial enforcement of the parties’ obligation to 
maintain secrecy regarding settlement terms. Judicially 
mandated secrecy may extend not only to the terms and 
amount of the settlement but also to other court 
documents, such as filed discovery papers.99 
                                                
93 Barry R. Furrow, The Patient Injury Epidemic: Medical Malpractice Litigation 
as a Curative Tool, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 41, 76 (2011). 
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Though secrecy in settlement agreements draws criticism, the 
majority of states don’t prohibit it.100 But confidential settlement of 
private litigation can be contrary to public interest where harm may 
reoccur.101 
Medical malpractice settlements are frequently confidential.102 A 
2015 study in a Texas university hospital system found that 89% of 
medical malpractice settlement agreements used nondisclosure 
agreements.103 All of the agreements in the study prohibited disclosure 
of settlement terms, half prohibited disclosure that an agreement had 
been reached, and 26% prohibited the claimant from reporting the 
matter to regulatory agencies.104 
Confidential settlement may encourage rapid resolution, but that is 
obtained at the cost of permanently barring access to potentially 
valuable information that could improve patient safety and the quality 
of care. 105  The Joint Commission contends that secret settlements 
deprive injured patients of the opportunity to advocate for change and 
deprive healthcare providers of the opportunity to learn from sealed 
cases.106 
Barrier #3: Limited access to insurance data. The liability 
insurance industry has a history of providing certain information to  
researchers on a voluntary basis, including some medical liability 
closed claims data.107 For example, five malpractice insurers provided 
data to Harvard researcher Dr. David Studdert for analysis aimed at 
determining the value of closed insurance claims data in patient safety 
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107 Baker, supra note 29, at 186. A “closed claim” is one that has been settled or 
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efforts. 108  Studdert and colleagues found closed malpractice claims 
were a rich source of data describing errors and factors that 
contributed to their occurrence.109 
Malpractice insurers use their own data to improve patient safety 
(they are, after all, highly motivated to minimize malpractice claims 
and payouts). For example, in the 1990s when many physicians were 
being sued for failure to diagnose breast cancer, CRICO110 found their 
insured physicians had no uniform approach to monitoring breast 
lumps. 111  The insurance firm developed a standard treatment 
algorithm, offered insured physicians who used it an insurance 
premium discount, and dramatically reduced litigation.112 
However, due to the nature of the insurance industry, there are 
limits to what has been provided to researchers, and to what can be 
expected.113 Currently, access to medical malpractice insurance data is 
provided at the discretion of the insurer and that access is not easy or 
certain.114 Insurers derive competitive advantage by protecting their 
data, and they have a significant interest in public policy debates that 
could be affected by research derived from their data. 115  Also, a 
researcher whose conclusions do not support an insurer’s agenda may 
be less likely to obtain access to future data than one whose research is 
supportive.116 
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A limitation on the value of closed claims analysis is the data were 
collected by the insurer for the purpose of resolving an insurance 
claim, not for patient safety research. 117  Additionally, medical 
malpractice closed claims data does not reflect information about 
claims that are still unresolved.118 
American malpractice insurance companies must file two types of 
closed claim reports. First, any payment made in satisfaction of a 
medical malpractice claim against a healthcare practitioner must be 
reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank (NPDB).119 The NPDB 
is a nationwide flagging system designed to alert employers such as 
hospitals or state licensing bodies to a healthcare provider’s 
malpractice record.120 The NPDB has a public use data file, containing 
de-identified data, available for researchers, journalists, and others to 
analyze patient safety trends. 121  However, the databank does not 
contain extensive information regarding the circumstances leading to a 
malpractice payment, only certain data mandated by federal law.122 
Some states require insurance providers to report medical malpractice 
payments to a state agency.123 However, the data reported concerns 
financial aspects of the claim—not detailed clinical data that would be 
of value to patient safety researchers. 
Second, medical malpractice payments also must be reported to 
state professional licensing agencies that license physicians, nurses, 
and others.124 While professional licensing has a patient safety and 
protection function by establishing academic standards and monitoring 
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clinical competency,125 the data reported do not entail detailed clinical 
records that would be of value in patient safety research. 
Conclusion. Detailed information is developed in the course of 
medical malpractice litigation, but little is accessible due to the broad 
use of nondisclosure agreements in settlements and, occasionally, in 
judicial sealing. Only limited access to closed malpractice insurance 
claims exists, and claims present a narrow perspective since only about 
3% of injured parties ever bring claims. The combination of these 
factors means the legal system currently plays a minimally useful role 
in revealing information that could be applied to the dire social 
problem of medical harm. 
IV. HOW MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LITIGATION HAS REDUCED 
PATIENT HARM 
[T]he real problem is too much medical malpractice, 
not too much litigation.126 
–Tom Baker 
A. The Health System Can Learn from Malpractice Litigation 
The value of medical malpractice litigation to the health system 
has been demonstrated in studies including some that transformed a 
highly risky medical specialty. Researcher Joanna Schwartz studied 
the influence of medical malpractice claims on the health system and 
discovered malpractice lawsuits offer safety improvement benefits, 
including: 
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1) Lawsuits reveal allegations of medical negligence and 
related patient safety issues not revealed in hospital 
reporting systems; 
2) Previously unknown details of adverse events are exposed 
in discovery and depositions; 
3) Analysis of malpractice claim trends can identify 
problematic procedures and hospital departments; and 
4) Closed insurance claims are important teaching tools.127 
The remedy for dangerous anesthesia care was malpractice 
litigation. The history of anesthesia care provides a particularly 
instructive illustration of how tort liability can motivate healthcare 
providers to root out and correct safety problems in healthcare delivery 
systems.128 The practice of anesthesia today is exceptionally safe but 
that was not always so, and lessons from malpractice litigation sparked 
the transformation. 129  From the 1950s into the 1980s, surgical 
anesthesia put patients at risk of serious injury and death–and about 
half the deaths were preventable. 130  The widespread harm from 
anesthesia exposed anesthesiologists to a high likelihood of 
malpractice lawsuits and they paid among the highest malpractice 
insurance premiums. 131  In response to its malpractice fiasco, and 
disturbing media reports surrounding it, the American Society of 
Anesthesiologists launched studies in 1984 using malpractice claim 
data.132 
The anesthesia “Closed Claims Project” examined medical 
malpractice insurance companies’ closed anesthesia malpractice 
litigation files. 133  A typical file contained the hospital record, 
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128 David A. Hyman & Charles Silver, The Poor State of Health Care Quality in the 
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anesthesia record, statements from personnel involved in the case, 
expert statements, deposition summaries, and the settlement or jury 
award. 134  The analysis was alarming: human error caused a large 
number of the anesthesia injuries.135 In response, the American Society 
of Anesthesiologists overhauled anesthesia practice by implementing 
patient monitoring standards, redesigning care procedures, shortening 
resident physicians’ hours on duty, standardizing equipment operation, 
and requiring use of patient monitoring devices.136 
The 25-year effort to make anesthesia safe for patients worked. 
The risk of death from anesthesia dropped from 1 in 5000 anesthesia 
administrations to 1 in 250,000.137 Less anesthetic harm meant fewer 
lawsuits. As anesthesia malpractice litigation dissipated, anesthesia 
providers’ malpractice insurance rates, once among the highest in 
medicine, fell to among the lowest.138 
It bears attention that the pressure to protect patients came from 
outside the health system139 and the health system changed because of 
malpractice litigation. 140  The anesthesia safety transformation 
demonstrates a system feedback process. Serious anesthesia errors 
harmed patients and generated lawsuits that in turn burdened 
anesthesia providers with litigation costs and high malpractice 
insurance premiums.141 Anesthesia practice changes led to lower error 
rates, fewer lawsuits, lower malpractice premiums, and the recognition 
of anesthesia as an exceptionally safe discipline.142 
Other researchers have uncovered the value in examining 
malpractice claims data. Dr. Thomas Glick, a Harvard Medical School 
professor, published a study of malpractice claims against neurologists 
and concluded that claims against physicians could educate them about 
medical errors and thereby improve patient safety and the quality of 
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care.143 A primary care malpractice claims study had a similar finding. 
The primary care researchers concluded that claims data identified 
conditions where primary healthcare is prone to “go awry” 144  and 
called the use of claims data “one of the richest opportunities for future 
research and efforts to help good doctors prevent lapses in care.”145 
V. OPTIONS FOR EXTRACTING MALPRACTICE DATA FROM THE 
LEGAL SYSTEM TO ENHANCE PATIENT SAFETY EFFORTS 
Those on the cutting edge of malpractice reform focus 
on the 2 percent of mistakes that enter the court system, 
in hopes of applying what they find to the 98 percent of 
errors that quietly send tens of thousands of Americans 
to the grave each year.146 
—Dr. Darshak Sanghavi 
A. Overview of Argument 
Extracting data from medical malpractice insurance claims can 
improve patient safety. The anesthesia studies demonstrated how data 
from litigation can spur change in the health system that prevents 
                                                
143 Thomas H. Glick, Malpractice Claims: Outcome Evidence to Guide Neurologic 
Education?, 56 NEUROLOGY 1099, 1100 (2001). Despite Dr. Glick’s conclusion 
that malpractice claims data offers a valuable learning opportunity for 
neurologists, the journal Neurology also published an editorial undermining 
Glick’s research findings. The editorial authors paid tribute to the “conventional 
wisdom” that the legal system is the problem, not part of the solution to 
addressing medical harm. The editorial authors stated, “to prevent and mitigate 
the effects of medical error and to develop evidence-based programs to reduce 
it, we need to collect, analyze, and understand very different data that those 
found in medical malpractice claims filed by insurance carriers” and 
“Unfortunately, one of the major reasons we know so little about the 
epidemiology of medical near misses and errors is because of our current legal 
system. The potential for litigation deters physicians and other care providers 
from furnishing information that could reveal mistakes in the system, because 
this information also could be used against them in a lawsuit.” Robert G. 
Holloway & Robert J. Panzer, Lawyers, Litigation, and Liability: Can They 
Make Patients Safer?, 56 NEUROLOGY 991, 992 (2001). 
144 Robert L. Phillips et al., Learning from Malpractice Claims about Negligent, 
Adverse Events in Primary Care in the United States, 13 QUAL. SAF. HEALTH 
CARE 121, 121 (2004). 
145 Id. at 126. 
146 Sanghavi, supra note 111. 
2016 Extracting Medical Injury Information 397 
injuries and saves lives. And, Schwartz’ 2013 study identified how 
litigation can reveal previously unknown patient safety problems. 
The intractability of the medical injuries issue indicates resolution 
will likely not take place solely by change initiated from within the 
health system. Therefore, this Note argues that efforts to enhance 
extraction of data from medical malpractice litigation can help shape 
knowledge of medical injuries and thereby influence change. But the 
ability to extract data, that will in turn provide feedback to the health 
system, is dependent on the accessibility of that data. 
Several strategies could increase access to patient data. First, the 
increasing the flow of medical malpractice claiming would increase 
the pool of data. When only about 3% of injured patients pursue a 
claim, about 97% of the potential legal information about medical 
injuries is inaccessible. Additionally, extracting data from confidential 
records could reveal valuable data. Finally, greater access to medical 
malpractice insurance claims could be used to improve patient safety 
as it has in the past. The following sections explore these strategies for 
enhancing access to data. 
 
FIGURE 1. Sources of medical injury data that could benefit 
patient safety improvements in the health system. 
B.  To Harvest More Malpractice Data, Bring More 
Malpractice Claims 
Barriers to claiming. The barriers to bringing malpractice claims 
are daunting and include access to justice, tort reform measures, and 
the stress that accompanies litigation. To increase the volume of 
medical malpractice claims, these barriers must be reduced. A major 
barrier to increased claiming is access to the justice system. Many 
patients who have experienced harm are unable to obtain legal 
representation, and not having an attorney effectively means no 
lawsuit.147 Medical malpractice lawsuits are expensive to litigate and 
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studies show attorneys reject 70% to 90% of medical malpractice cases 
they screen. 148  In a 2014 national study of attorneys, a researcher 
determined that 95% of potential medical malpractice plaintiffs would 
find it extremely difficult to locate an attorney willing to take on a case 
unless expected damages are at least $250,000 (even when the case is 
almost certain to win on the merits).149 
High litigation costs mean attorneys refuse to represent patients 
with “smaller” claims, and because the majority of medical negligence 
events do not lead to serious harm, many patients are thus unable to 
secure legal representation.150 Even claimants initially accepted by an 
attorney may be dropped as information is developed—not because 
there was no negligence but because damages appear insufficient to 
proceed.151 
Some states have implemented tort reform measures that make it 
more difficult for claimants to bring medical malpractice claims. 
Wisconsin is a case in point. Despite reports that medical errors are 
increasing, Wisconsin malpractice lawsuits dropped 50% from 1999-
2014. 152  Wisconsin lawmakers capped several types of damages 
available in malpractice (as have about 34 other states). 153  Caps 
limiting damage awards discourage lawyers from taking cases. 154 
Wisconsin even caps fees lawyers can receive if successful in medical 
malpractice cases.155 A powerful physician’s lobby is credited with 
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exerting influence on the Wisconsin legislature to craft the malpractice 
laws that favor physicians, not patients.156 
At least thirty states have adopted medical malpractice laws, 
reflecting a shift toward statutory control of medical malpractice 
litigation and away from governance by court-made common law.157 
These tort reforms include immunity provisions for healthcare 
providers and institutions, notice requirements for plaintiffs, pretrial 
screening to discourage cases without merit, prohibitions on ad 
damnum clauses (the suggested dollar amounts a plaintiff requests a 
court to award), collateral source rules requiring money damages be 
offset by payments from sources such as health or disability insurance, 
and limits on damages (as in Wisconsin).158 In jurisdictions that have 
enacted medical malpractice tort reform to tighten compensation rules, 
the measures do nothing to encourage quality improvement in the 
health system.159 
In all jurisdictions, there are practical considerations that dissuade 
potential claimants from bringing a malpractice action. Patients 
considering a claim may be sick or injured as a result of their 
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treatment160 and the system itself has been characterized as expensive, 
burdensome, slow, and stingy.161 The average tried malpractice case 
can last over three years.162 
The process of civil litigation is stressful for plaintiffs.163 Justice 
Learned Hand commented, “as a litigant I should dread a lawsuit 
beyond almost anything short of sickness and death.”164 And, even 
when a patient can secure an attorney and withstand the stress of the 
legal process, the odds are against plaintiffs who go to trial. Healthcare 
provider-defendants win most malpractice jury trials. 165  Two 
malpractice trial studies found defendants prevailed in 81% and 73% 
of cases.166 
Strategies to increase malpractice claiming and data 
availability. Malpractice researcher Rogan Kersh observed, “Among 
the few self-evident truths about the U.S. medical malpractice system 
is that it desperately needs reforming.”167 There is no simple reform 
that would encourage malpractice claiming and thereby create access 
to dormant data. While medical malpractice reform measures have 
been brandished, little political will to pursue comprehensive system 
reform has been observed.168 
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Overcoming the “malpractice myth.” A conventional wisdom 
has infused many conversations about medical malpractice litigation 
and has shaped policy initiatives such as tort reform that favors 
healthcare providers and organizations. It’s been termed the 
“malpractice myth” by insurance and medical malpractice expert Tom 
Baker. 169  The myth espouses the view that there’s too much 
malpractice litigation, most claims are frivolous, and undeserving 
patients get unjustified damage awards (“jackpot justice”).170 Other 
facets of the myth are that malpractice insurance rates are driven up by 
high rates of litigation, physicians are one malpractice verdict away 
from bankruptcy, and physicians flee to states that have adopted 
malpractice award damages caps.171 Medical malpractice researchers 
Dr. David Hyman and attorney Charles Silver call these views 
“mistaken and misleading.”172 
The reality is that there is an epidemic of medical malpractice and 
actually very little malpractice litigation. 173  Any “patient-centered” 
public policy proposal aimed at increasing the volume of medical 
malpractice claims would need to overcome the “malpractice myth.” 
Policy change could only succeed if too much medical injury is 
acknowledged as the primary problem, not too much medical 
malpractice litigation. 
Assuming the malpractice myth can be dispelled, policy options 
that could streamline the litigation process, resolve more malpractice 
claims and therefore generate more data, include the use of health 
courts, mediation, arbitration, and administrative compensation boards. 
These are briefly discussed here. 
Health Courts. The concept of a “health court,” an administrative 
entity that would process malpractice claims outside the tort system, 
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has been advanced by reform advocates.174 Specially qualified judges 
would determine compensation decisions in what would arguably be a 
faster, more reliable, more transparent process that would increase the 
number of patients who recover. 175  However, health courts would 
invite constitutional challenges because they would abrogate the 
traditional role of the judiciary and the right to a trial by jury.176 
Mediation. In mediation, an impartial third party works with 
parties to resolve a dispute.177 It is a confidential, voluntary process 
where the resolution is negotiated by the parties offers some 
advantages over other dispute resolution processes.178 When used soon 
after injury, parties can resolve claims promptly and the parties 
themselves make decisions rather than having a resolution imposed on 
them by an arbitrator or judge.179 Mediation provides cost savings by 
shortening the litigation process and, in theory, information that 
emerges could be used to improve patient care.180 
Arbitration. A less complex version of litigation, arbitration 
utilizes simplified rules of evidence and there is no discovery.181 Like 
mediation, arbitration is less costly than litigation and offers more 
flexibility than a trial.182  Arbitration, unlike mediation, results in a 
binding resolution that can be overturned only if malfeasance during 
the arbitration process is shown.183 
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No-Fault Administrative Compensation. One reform proposal 
involves creating a malpractice resolution system modeled on 
Workers’ Compensation that removes negligence as the eligibility 
qualification.184 In one version of this model, an administrative body 
would evaluate injury claims that are carved out of the tort system and 
fast-tracked for compensation.185 Claimants would not require legal 
representation, and claims would be resolved by neutral adjudicators 
and medical experts.186 Patients might receive compensation according 
to a schedule for reasonable healthcare, rehabilitation expenses not 
covered by insurance, and lost wages up to a maximum amount.187 
This process would replace a negligence determination with an 
avoidability standard (whether a problem could have been avoided), a 
more permissive standard than negligence that would result in a larger 
pool of claimants eligible for compensation.188  The U.S. has some 
experience with this model. The Federal Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Program handles specified vaccine-related injuries, and two states use 
administrative systems to resolve certain birth-related neurological 
injuries.189 
Repeal tort reforms that dissuade claims. Conventional tort 
reforms aim to winnow the number of potential lawsuits as well as the 
amount of damages awarded.190 Most tort reforms will not improve 
error reporting or health system safety and quality. 191  The most 
frequently-discussed reforms (e.g., damage caps, credits for collateral 
source payments, and contingency fee limits) are targeted at reducing 
insurance costs—not improving unsafe care or reducing medical 
errors.192 Repealing any of these conventional tort reform measures 
would likely enhance litigation volume. 
In summary, these options could remove barriers to malpractice 
claims so patients with legitimate medical injury cases would enjoy 
improved access to justice. This, in turn, would create records 
                                                
184 Studdert, supra note 58, at 289. 
185 Id. 
186 Shepherd, supra note 148, at 195. 
187 BAKER, supra note 85 at 163. 
188 Studdert, supra note 58, at 289. 
189 Shepherd, supra note 148, at 195. 
190 Studdert, supra note 58, at 288. 
191 Hyman, supra note 128, at 899. 
192 Id. 
404 UMass Law Review v. 11 | 372 
documenting medical malpractice cases, and that would add data to the 
pool of knowledge about medical injuries. These strategies could open 
the doors to the justice system for some of the 97% of injured patients 
who never bring a malpractice claim. 
However, increasing the volume of litigation has major 
implications for an already stressed justice system. For example, 
across the nation, federal district courts have experienced a rise in 
recent years in the time required to get civil cases to trial as judges’ 
workloads have increased.193 Chief District Judge Fred Biery of the 
Western District of Texas remarked, “It would be nice to get some 
help. We are pedaling as fast as we can on an increasingly rickety 
bicycle.”194 Additional resources would be essential to manage any 
increase in malpractice litigation in the courts. The political 
complexities of enacting “patient-centered” change would require 
overcoming the “malpractice myth” as well as powerful interest 
groups. (A full discussion of the complexities of interest group politics 
is beyond the scope of this Note.) 
C.  Reduce Secrecy in Settlements and Litigation to Improve 
Access to Data 
Civil litigation has the power to uncover otherwise hidden 
information about practices that result in injury.195 But common legal 
practices such as protective orders, sealing orders, and confidential 
settlements deprive the public of information that might be helpful in 
preventing such injuries and deaths.196 
Public health refers to measures to prevent disease, promote health, 
and prolong life in a population as a whole.197 A main function of 
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public health is formulating public policies designed to solve identified 
local and national health problems.198 Medical errors were labeled a 
serious public health problem as early as 2001.199 This Note argues 
that, when considering approaches to increasing access to medical 
malpractice data, medical injuries in the U.S. should be viewed as a 
public health and safety hazard demanding a policy response. 
Advocates of public access to information argue that secrecy covers up 
unexposed danger, that the public has a right to information 
concerning a public risk, and that private parties’ rights to 
confidentiality should be subordinated to public safety. 200 
Additionally, they contend that if disclosure allows the justice system 
to better protect and serve the public by, for example warning of 
harms, then secrecy must be minimized.201 
Anti-secrecy advocates also argue that suppressing information 
about dangers inherent in corporate behavior in healthcare deprives 
regulators, other litigants, and consumers of important safety 
information.202 Certain factors weigh in favor of public disclosure such 
as when a high degree of harm or a risk of death is involved, a high 
likelihood that unknown third parties will be harmed, and when the 
secret settlement will conceal a harm from others.203 
Recent legislative initiatives aimed at increasing “sunshine” by 
prohibiting or reducing secret settlements of civil lawsuits demonstrate 
the public’s discomfort with confidential settlements. 204  Several 
approaches to increase transparency in the resolution of claims 
include: 
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1) Adopting a presumption all court records are open to the 
public; 
2) Limiting use of protective orders in discovery; 
3) Requiring a party to show good cause before sealing court 
files; 
4) Requiring a public hearing before sealing a court file; 
5) Forbidding secret settlements in court; and 
6) Making confidentiality agreements void as against public 
policy if the agreement conceals a public hazard.205 
Several states and one court in particular have instituted sunshine 
rules that merit consideration in a discussion of how to increase access 
to medical injury data.206 
Texas Rule 76a. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a, adopted in 
1990, presumes all court records including settlements are open to the 
public and may only be sealed upon specific showing.207 Rule 76a lays 
out a test a party seeking to seal a record must satisfy. 
First, the party seeking sealing must identify “a specific, serious, 
and substantial interest which clearly outweighs (1) this presumption 
of openness, and (2) any probably adverse effect that sealing will have 
upon the general public health or safety.”208 Additionally, the party 
must show that “no less restrictive means than sealing records will 
adequately and effectively protect the specific interest asserted.”209 A 
court must balance the interest of the party seeking secrecy against the 
public interest.210 
Florida’s Sunshine in Litigation Act. The Florida Sunshine in 
Litigation Act was adopted in 1990 and goes farther than the Texas 
rule by “preemptively prohibiting, without any balancing of private 
and public interests, the sealing of any information that has the 
purpose of concealing a public hazard or contains information that 
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would be useful in protecting oneself from a public hazard.”211 The 
law defines a public hazard broadly as “any . . . instrumentality that 
has caused and is likely to cause injury.”212 Thus, this broad statute 
may encroach on personal privacy.213 
South Carolina District Court’s secrecy ban. The nation’s 
strictest secrecy ban is the South Carolina District Court’s Local Civil 
Rule 5.03(e) that prohibits any settlement agreement filed with the 
court to be sealed. 214  South Carolina’s federal trial judges voted 
unanimously to ban secret settlements because such agreements “made 
the courts complicit in hiding the truth about hazardous products, inept 
doctors, and sexually abusive priests.”215 However, private agreements 
made out of court can still freely suppress information about dangers 
to public safety.216 
New Jersey’s medical malpractice law. New Jersey adopted an 
anti-secrecy rule that applies specifically to medical malpractice 
information, whether generated through judicial action or private 
settlement. 217  The 2003 law requires any information about a 
malpractice award to be posted on the defendant’s internet profile—
but without any balancing of interests including privacy.218 
Recommendations. While the concept of greater transparency in 
tort actions is simple, making it happen is complicated.219 The public’s 
interest in information must be balanced by privacy protections and 
ensuring that courts remain efficient forums in which to resolve 
disputes. 220  Though this Note argues enhanced transparency is 
desirable in providing access to medical injury data, matters of private 
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interest that do not threaten public health or safety, or conceal a public 
hazard, should always be exempt from disclosure.221 
For cases resolved via the courts, there are viable public policy 
options that could increase transparency. Senator Herbert Kohl 
introduced a “Sunshine in Litigation” bill multiple times during the 
course of his 24 years in the U.S. Senate.222 The legislation, if it had 
passed, would have applied to protective orders and sealing of cases 
and settlements. 223  The bill’s language required judges to use a 
balancing test to weigh the need for secrecy against the potential for 
harm to the public, and to make specific factual findings before 
entering a confidentiality order.224 A challenge in enacting a fair anti-
secrecy law is that confidentiality determinations would require 
painstaking case-by-case analysis.225 However, “weighing competing 
interests is what judges do on a daily basis.”226 Federal action though 
seems unlikely, thus states could follow in Texas’s balancing test 
regulation to increase transparency. 
Greater access to privately-negotiated out-of-court settlements that 
are protected with nondisclosure agreements is not likely. However, 
payment in these settlements must be reported by the insurer to the 
National Practitioner Databank. If the data elements were expanded 
there would be additional information available to patient safety 
researchers. 
D.  Increase Access to Medical Malpractice Insurance Claims 
Data 
The anesthesia closed claims study demonstrated the value of 
using insurance data to influence the health system. But most 
researchers have been unable to gain access to closed claims records 
except limited information provided to state insurance departments in 
Florida, Texas, and Missouri. 227  As long as access to liability 
                                                
221 Smith, supra note 27, at 266. 
222 SUNSHINE IN LITIGATION ACT OF 2011, S. Rep. No. 112-045 (2015), 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/cpquery/?&sid=cp112SUHud&r_n=sr045.112&dbn
ame=cp112&&sel=TOC_46858& [http://perma.cc/SGU4-M6YT]. 
223 Joseph F. Anderson, Secrecy in the Courts: At the Tipping Point, 53 VILL. L. 
REV. 811, 827 (2008). 
224 Id. 
225 Cheit, supra note 219, at 269. 
226 Anderson, supra note 223, at 827-28. 
227 Baker, supra note 29, at 194. 
2016 Extracting Medical Injury Information 409 
insurance data relies on the insurer’s discretion, the information 
provided will likely be incomplete, and may be biased to favor the 
public policy agenda of the insurance carrier.228 
The presently private nature of malpractice claims could be 
brought more fully into public view, though that is unlikely without 
government action.229 The Insurance Research Council (IRC) collects 
extensive data on motor vehicle claims from insurers and publishes 
large data-sets every three to five years. 230  Each participating 
automobile insurer provides individual claims-level data creating a 
pool of about 80,000 claims.231 Mandatory reporting of de-identified 
medical malpractice claims data to the Insurance Research Council or 
other appropriate agency could significantly enhance the quantity and 
quality of medical injury claims data now available. Congressional 
action would be required to enact this policy but would garner data far 
beyond what is now accessible. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
We decided long ago that the dangers of excessive and 
unwarranted concealment of pertinent facts far 
outweighs the dangers which are cited to justify it.232 
–John. F. Kennedy 
 
The extent of medical errors, injuries, and negligence in the United 
States health system should shock the conscience of anyone made 
aware. While tribute must be paid to those who have contributed to 
patient safety improvements, the intractability of the problem demands 
new strategies be added to tools currently used. Solutions will not be 
effective unless they are firmly rooted in valid and reliable data. Thus, 
this Note has argued that it’s time for the health system to look to rich 
sources of data within the legal system. 
The anesthesia closed claims studies transformed a risky medical 
specialty into a safe one, demonstrating the powerful influence 
research using closed medical malpractice insurance claims can have 
on a problem-riddled system. Mandating that medical malpractice 
insurers report detailed, de-identified data to a third party collection 
agency is likely the most achievable of the recommendations proposed 
in this Note. However, even if access were provided to data from every 
closed malpractice claim, the sample size would be only three percent 
of the entire universe of patients who experience some type of medical 
harm.   
Secrecy in litigation can hide harm from the public. Although court 
records documented the dangers associated with the fatal marriage of 
Firestone tires and Ford Explorers, 271 deaths and over 800 serious 
injuries occurred before unsealed court documents revealed the 
danger. 233  The Florida and New Jersey approaches to medical 
malpractice that demand full “sunshine” are a step too far though. 
Patients must have the option to preserve their privacy if they so 
choose. But Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a provides an exemplar 
for other jurisdictions to consider. The rule presumes openness in 
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judicial records but permits sealing if a party can show that sealing 
will have no adverse effect on public health and safety. 
A bigger malpractice litigation pipeline could foster real change in 
the health system (and provide compensation to many who are harmed 
but have no access to justice in the current system). Effective pressure 
for safer hospital culture is most likely to develop from an increased 
risk of liability – stimulated by an increase in patient safety lawsuits.234 
Medical malpractice tort reform has been legislated on behalf of 
special interest groups – not on behalf of patients who have 
experienced medical injury. Patient-centered tort reform could erode 
barriers to bringing claims that now exist. Notwithstanding the need 
for better access the medical injury data, patients who experience harm 
deserve better access to justice than exists now. But to handle a larger 
volume of cases, more resources would be essential. 
Policy change is unlikely to address any patient-centered medical 
malpractice issue until the “malpractice myth” is exposed and 
discarded. The entrenched myth, resting on such misconceptions as 
patients winning undeserved “jackpot justice,” is widely accepted 
despite resting on a wobbly factual foundation. 
Public access to litigation-generated information permits citizens 
to observe and participate in the judicial system and gain confidence 
that courts serve public, as well as private, interests. 235  Enhancing 
access to medical malpractice data is a logical role for the tort system 
because of the intractability of the medical injury problem. The tort 
system’s social utility function requires that it work toward the good of 
society, and the medical negligence problem infesting the health 
system demands action. 
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